Reassessing policy paradigms : a comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries by Hawkins, Benjamin et al.
This is an author produced version of Reassessing policy paradigms : a comparison of the
global tobacco and alcohol industries.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/98904/
Article:
Hawkins, Benjamin, Holden, Chris orcid.org/0000-0003-1874-1408, Eckhardt, Jappe 
orcid.org/0000-0002-8823-0905 et al. (1 more author) (2016) Reassessing policy 
paradigms : a comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries. Global Public 
Health. ISSN 1744-1706 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2016.1161815
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
1 
 
Reassessing policy paradigms: A comparison of the global tobacco and alcohol industries 
 
 
Benjamin Hawkinsa*, Chris Holdenb, Jappe Eckhardtc and Kelley Leed 
 
 
aDepartment of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK; bDepartment of Social Policy & Social Work, University of York, 
Heslington, UK; cDepartment of Politics, University of York, Heslington, UK; dFaculty of Health 
Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada 
 
 
*Corresponding author. Email:  ben.hawkins@lshtm.ac.uk 
2 
 
Abstract 
Tobacco is widely considered to be a uniquely harmful product for human health. Since 
the mid-1990s, the strategies of transnational tobacco corporations to undermine effective 
tobacco control policy has been extensively documented through internal industry documents. 
Consequently, the sale, use and marketing of tobacco products are subject to extensive regulation 
and formal measures to exclude the industry from policy making have been adopted in the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). In contrast to tobacco, alcohol is subject to 
less stringent forms of regulation, and the alcohol industry continues to play a central role in 
policymaking in many countries and at the global level. This article examines whether there is a 
sufficient rationale for such different regulatory approaches, through a comparative analysis of 
the political economy of the tobacco and alcohol industries including the structure of the 
industries, and the market and political strategies they pursue. Despite some important 
differences, the extensive similarities which exist between the tobacco and alcohol industries in 
terms of market structure and strategy, and political strategy, call into question the rationale for 
both the relatively weak regulatory approach taken towards alcohol, and the continued 
participation of alcohol corporations in policy-making processes.  
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Introduction 
When consumed precisely as intended by their manufacturers, tobacco products kill 50% 
of their long-term users prematurely (WHO 2013a). Consequently, they have been identified as 
posing a unique threat to public health. Since the public release of internal industry documents, 
principally as a result of litigation from the mid-1990s, an extensive literature has documented 
the strategies employed by transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) to further their corporate 
interests at the expense of public health (Proctor 2012). Partly as a result of this exposure, TTCs 
have been increasingly excluded from direct and formal involvement in policy making processes 
in many countries and at the global level (Brandt 2012), although they continue to influence 
policy through indirect and informal mechanisms (Savell et al. 2014). The need for effective 
tobacco control policies, and to protect policy-making processes from undue influence by the 
tobacco industry, have given rise to far-reaching regulation at the national level and a unique 
global policy response (WHO 2013b). The WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC) commits states parties to implement a range of evidence-based tobacco control policies 
including restrictions on industry influence over policy making. This unprecedented measure was 
facilitated, in part, by claims about the exceptional nature of both the tobacco epidemic and the 
industry identified as its key vector (Jahiel and Babor 2007, Wipfli 2015). 
The logic of tobacco exceptionalism has been deployed by public health advocates to 
JUHDWHIIHFWDQGKDVEHFRPHDNH\SLOODURI WKHWREDFFRFRQWUROFRPPXQLW\¶VSROLF\GLVFRXUVH
For example, tobacco control advocates successfully used the exceptional public health threat 
ZKLFKVPRNLQJSRVHVWRSXVKIRUDµFDUYHRXW¶RIWREDFFR products from international trade and 
investment agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)(Sy and Stumberg 2014, 
McGrady 2007, Freeman 2015). However, the tobacco exceptionalism argument is now being 
called into question by the increasing focus on the health impacts of other products and political 
strategies of corporations in other sectors, including the alcohol industry (Moodie et al. 2013, 
Jahiel and Babor 2007). There is an increasing recognition of the substantial health harms caused 
by alcohol (Rehm et al. 2009). While tobacco remains the leading cause of avoidable death 
globally, responsible for around 5.4 million death per year (8% of global mortality), alcohol 
causes an estimated 3.3 million deaths per year (5.9% of global mortality) (WHO 2014)  and 
accounts for 5.1% of the global burden of disease measured in disability-adjusted life-years 
(DALYs) (WHO 2015a). In addition, alcohol is responsible for a range of socio-economic as 
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well as health harms (WHO 2014). Recent scholarship on alcohol industry actors also suggests 
they employ political strategies highly similar to those more extensively documented amongst 
the tobacco industry (McCambridge et al. 2013b, Hawkins and Holden 2013, Holden et al. 2012, 
Holden and Hawkins 2012, Hawkins et al. 2012, Hawkins and Holden 2012, Jernigan 2012, 
Babor and Robaina 2013, Stenius and Babor 2010, Babor 2009). 
Despite the substantial health harms associated with alcohol, and the emerging literature 
on the activities of the alcohol industry, policies in many countries (and in sub-national 
jurisdictions responsible for alcohol policy) remain weak in comparison with tobacco control 
policies. At the global level, there is no equivalent of the FCTC for alcohol policy, and few signs 
that political will exists to negotiate such an agreement. Moreover, alcohol industry engagement 
in policy-making remains extensive (McCambridge et al. 2013a, Babor and Robaina 2013, 
Jernigan 2012, Ferreira-Borges et al. 2014).  
This article critically assesses the rationale, or justification, for the very different 
regulatory approaches taken to tobacco and alcohol through a comparison of the tobacco and 
alcohol industries. It is important to highlight that we do not seek to explain the emergence and 
maintenance of different policy regimes applied to each type of product and their respective 
industries. This would require a fuller engagement with the myriad factors which determine 
policy outcomes and is beyond the remit of the current paper. Our objective is instead to 
scrutinise the prevailing policy regimes in each area in light of the similarities and differences 
which exist between the two products and industries. We take a political economy approach , 
focussing on the structure of each industry and the political and market strategies they pursue . 
We employ the term political economy here to denote an approach premised upon the essentially 
inseparable nature of the political and economic spheres. In relation to corporate strategy, this 
entails a recognition that corporations wilO HPSOR\ERWKPDUNHWDQGSROLWLFDO VWUDWHJLHVDV µWZR
VLGHVRIWKHVDPHFRLQ¶ LQSXUVXLWRIWKHLULQWHUHVWV(Baron 1995). Specifically, in this analysis, 
we focus on two related but distinct aspects of the interface between political decision making 
and key economic actors. First, we examine how the structure of the industries, and their market 
strategies impact on consumption and public health, creating policy problems to which 
governments must respond. Second, we examine the role played by these powerful economic 
actors in the policy-making process and their ability to shape policy outcomes. 
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This approach recognises both that corporate strategy is a key driver of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) (Moodie et al. 2013) and that, to date, no systematic comparison 
of these aspects of the two industries has been undertaken. Whilst market strategies are a key 
driver of consumption (and thus harm), requiring specific regulatory responses by governments, 
political strategies seek explicitly to shape the regulatory environments in which corporations 
operate. Market structure, particularly the degree of concentration and transnationalisation of a 
sector, affects the ability of corporations to execute both their market and political strategies. It is 
thus vital to consider both aspects of corporate strategy in evaluating the rationale for the current 
differences in alcohol and tobacco policy, and the broader policy paradigms which inform the 
regulatory approach to each industry. While there have been comparisons between tobacco and 
other sectors, such as the soft drinks, pharmaceutical and chemical industries (White and Bero 
2010, Dorfman et al. 2012), to date there has been no systematic comparison of the alcohol and 
tobacco industries as political actors. Consequently the article addresses an important gap in the 
comparative literature on corporations and health. 
The structure of the article is as follows: We begin by setting out the current regulatory 
approaches to tobacco and alcohol at both the global and national levels, and the status afforded 
to each industry within policy-making processes. We then compare the structure of the two 
industries and the market and political strategies pursued by corporations in each sector. The 
final part of the article reflects on the rationale for the different approaches taken to tobacco, 
alcohol and their producers in light of the analysis presented. 
 
Differing policy approaches 
Approaches to regulating tobacco products vary between the different countries and 
regions of the world (Cairney et al. 2011). This reflects, amongst other factors, the different 
socio-cultural positions of these products and the relative success of tobacco control advocates in 
different contexts in lobbying for policy change (Mamudu et al. 2014). In general, less robust 
policy regimes are in place in much of the developing world than in most high income countries 
(Holden and Lee, 2009), although there are some notable exceptions to the rule such as Thailand 
(Chantornvong and McCargo 2001, Levy et al. 2008). Policy approaches in the 180 ratifying 
countries are now guided by the FCTC, and are reinforced by the MPOWER measures 
developed by WHO which aim to facilitate effective implementation of the treaty by 
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governments (WHO 2015b). Price increases through taxation have been widely accepted as a 
means of reducing tobacco consumption (Chaloupka 2000). Bans on smoking in public places 
are now widespread in Europe, North America and beyond. Despite variations in their size and 
form (e.g. the inclusion of graphic images), health warnings on cigarette packaging are 
commonplace. These measures have been accompanied by restrictions to advertising and 
promotion of tobacco products across different media (and at point of sale), and to tobacco 
industry sponsorship of sporting and cultural events. Marketing restrictions were further 
extended with the introduction of generic packaging for cigarettes in Australia (Mitchell and 
Studdert 2012). Furthermore, this approach highlights that there is now widespread acceptance of 
the internationalisation of tobacco control as a policy area in which international organizations, 
not just states, play a key role (Cairney et al. 2015). 
In contrast,  the WHO Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (WHO 
2010) is significantly weaker than the FCTC. Unlike the FCTC, the Global Alcohol Strategy is 
not a legally binding international treaty, and the measures it contains are considerably less 
extensive, reflecting the continued framing of alcohol policy as a national issue. As with tobacco, 
national alcohol policies vary considerably in scope and effectiveness. Alcohol tax regimes vary 
across territorial domains and product categories, leading to differences in the prices of similar 
products between markets, and between products categories within a given market. Other laws 
regulate maximum blood alcohol levels for drivers. Despite exceptions, such as the French Loi 
Evin, restrictions on alcohol marketing and sponsorship are generally less extensive than for 
tobacco (Casswell 2012, Cairney and Studlar 2014), and are often policed through ineffective 
self-regulatory regimes and voluntary codes of practise promoted by the alcohol industry 
(Harkins 2010, Baggott 2010, Hawkins and Holden 2012). To date there has been no equivalent 
in the alcohol field of the globally co-ordinated health education campaigns seen for tobacco. 
The difference in approach to tobacco and alcohol is underlined by the policy regimes in 
IRUFHLQ(XURSHWKHUHJLRQZLWKWKHZRUOG¶VKLJKHVWOHYHOVRIDOFRKROFRQVXPSWLRQDQd alcohol 
attributable mortality and morbidity. Despite the harms attributable to alcohol, a far weaker 
policy regime is in place at the European Union (EU) level for alcohol than for tobacco (Gornall 
2014). Many aspects of tobacco policy, including product packaging and labelling, are 
extensively regulated at the EU level via the 2014 Tobacco Products Directive (TPD).  In 
FRQWUDVWWRWKLVWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V$OFRKRO6WUDWHJ\ODFNVWKHUHJXODWRU\IRUFHRI
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the TPD, and adopts a voluntary approach based on partnership with industry via the Alcohol and 
Health Forum (Gornall 2014). Moreover, the strategy expired in 2012 and has yet to be replaced 
despite widespread criticism from NGOs. 
Perhaps the clearest distinction between the tobacco and alcohol industries is the status 
each occupies in policymaking. The extensive documentation of tobacco industry tactics has led 
to widespread exclusion of tobacco companies from policy-making processes, both globally and 
nationally (Hurt et al. 2009, Holden and Lee 2009). The protection of public policy from tobacco 
industry influence is enshrined in Article 5.3 of the FCTC. In addition, Clause 38 of the Political 
Declaration of the United Nations High Level Meeting on the Prevention and Control of Non-
communicable Diseases (WHO 2012b), which sought to address the prevention and control of 
non-communicable diseases at the global level, precludes engagement with TTCs, explicitly 
UHFRJQLVLQJµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOFRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWEHWZHHQWKHWREDFFRLQGXVWU\DQGSXEOLF KHDOWK¶
(WHO 2012b). 
The alcohol industry, by contrast, remains an accepted participant in public policy 
making, despite fundamental conflicts of interest (McCambridge et al. 2013c, Room 2004, 
Gilmore et al. 2011, Casswell 2013).  The UN Declaration contains multiple references to 
engagement with private sector actors (other than the tobacco industry), viewing them as civil 
society organisations (WHO 2012b). This allowed the direct participation of alcohol industry 
actors, including AB-Inbev and SABMiller, in influential hearings which fed into debate at the 
meeting and the political declaration which followed (Stuckler et al. 2011). In many countries, 
such as the UK, the alcohol industry is treated as a key stakeholder in policy debates and given 
extensive access to decision makers (Hawkins and Holden 2012, Holden and Hawkins 2012). 
Despite the exclusion of the tobacco industry from many policy-making forums, it is 
important not to overstate the extent to which its influence has been curtailed. The openness of 
governments to tobacco industry actors varies greatly; some countries have not signed or ratified 
the FCTC, and implementation remains partial among those that have (WHO 2012a). Even 
where direct engagement is politically problematic, indirect influence persists through the 
creation of front groups, third party lobbying and funding of political campaigns (Savell et al. 
2014). Events surrounding the TPD demonstrate the resources and tactics which TTCs are still 
able to deploy to influence policy debates (McKee 2013). In addition, recent challenges to 
generic packaging in Australia, by five states under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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Dispute Settlement Mechanism, highlight the continuing ability of TTCs to enlist sympathetic 
governments, and to use international forums to pursue their interests (Jarman et al. 2012). 
Ukraine withdrew its claim against Australia in June 2015 leaving Honduras, Cuba, Indonesia 
and Dominican Republic as the remaining plaintiffs.  Nevertheless, alcohol companies generally 
continue to enjoy far greater access to policymakers at all levels than tobacco companies.  
 
Methods 
Whilst we do not seek to explain how different policy regimes emerged for alcohol and 
tobacco, we use a political economy lens to investigate whether there is an adequate rationale for 
the clear differences which exist in the current regulatory approaches to each product, and the 
status of the two industries in the policy process. We do this through a comparative analysis of 
three key factors relating to the political economy of each industry: industry structure, market 
strategy and political strategy. We know from a large literature on the behaviour of TTCs, a less 
developed literature on the alcohol sector and on other health-harming industries, and from the 
broader political economy and management literature, that corporations utilise both market and 
political strategies to further their underlying objectives to drive sales and thus profits (Baron, 
1995; Farnsworth, 2004; Holden and Lee, 2009; McCambridge et al, 2013a). 
Market strategies include activities such as branding, advertising, promotion, pricing and 
the establishment of new markets to increase sales. Consequently, they are key drivers of 
consumption and thus harm for products such as tobacco and alcohol. Policy makers seek to 
respond to such strategies with measures that are primarily designed to reduce demand for 
harmful products, such as price increases, product labelling and advertising restrictions. The 
specific measures enacted by governments will be partly determined by the market strategies 
pursued by the industry in question. This means a clear understanding of market strategy pursued 
by the tobacco and alcohol industries is essential in evaluating the rationale for current policy 
regimes. 
Political strategies are defined as measures employed by corporations to avoid, evade, 
moderate, block or otherwise influence policies relating to the industry and influence the ways in 
which industry actors will be viewed, and engaged with, by policy makers. This includes 
lobbying decision makers, funding campaigns and political parties, engaging in co- and self-
9 
 
regulatory regimes and funding and promoting policy relevant research. Understanding 
variations in market and political strategies between industries is of central importance in 
evaluating the different regulatory approaches taken to them. Differences in market strategy 
between sectors would provide a rationale for different regulatory approaches, whilst differences 
in political strategy may suggest  different statuses be afforded to industry actors in the formation 
and delivery of policy measures.  
The structure of an industry ± in terms of market concentration, and the size, profitability 
and transnationality of the major corporations active in the sector ± is a key factor influencing the 
market and political strategies adopted by firms and their ability to execute these strategies. In 
terms of market strategy, the more concentrated an industry is, the more likely firms within it 
will be able to exert control over pricing (Holden and Lee 2009, Adams and Brock 1998). 
Similarly, size and profitability will all affect the resources that firms dedicate to branding and 
promotional activities. Measures of transnationalisation reflect the scale of expansion into new 
markets. The greater resources commanded by large firms are known to increase their ability to 
exert political influence (Dür and Mateo 2012). Market concentration places control over entire 
sectors into the hands of a limited number of powerful economic actors. Their economic 
importance as providers of employment and tax revenues means they are of key strategic 
importance to governments, affording companies commensurately high levels of access to policy 
makers. The transnationality of corporations further augments their political power. As we 
explain below, corporations active across national borders may have the ability to engage in 
µYHQXHVKRSSLQJ¶(Baumgartner and Jones 1993) to locate favourable regulatory environments, 
RU XVH WKH WKUHDW RI µH[LW¶ to secure  concessions or incentives from a host government 
(Farnsworth and Holden 2006). 
We investigate industry structure using the following measures: the concentration ratio of 
each sector using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI); the size of leading corporations in 
each sector by revenue using Fortune PDJD]LQH¶V*OREDOOLVWWKHGHJUHHRIWUDQVQDWLRQDOLW\
RI FRUSRUDWLRQV LQ HDFK VHFWRU XVLQJ 81&7$'¶V WUDQVQDWLRQDOLW\ LQGH[ DQG FRUSRUDWH
profitability in each sector measured by EBITA margin. More details of each of these measures 
are given in the relevant section of the article below. 
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Both market and political strategies are analysed via a narrative review of peer-reviewed 
articles, other scholarly publications, and market analyses and reports published by scholars, 
government agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). We began by searching the 
:HE RI 6FLHQFH GDWDEDVH XVLQJ WKH WHUPV ³DOFRKRO LQGXVWU\´ $1' ³SROLF\´ DQG ³WREDFFR
LQGXVWU\´$1'³SROLF\´DQGWKHQHPSOR\HGDVQRZEDOOLQJWHFKnique whereby the reference lists 
of identified publications were used to generate additional relevant sources. Articles were 
included in the review where they related primarily to the market or political strategies of 
relevant corporations. Whilst we aimed to investigate these factors in a rigorous manner, 
developing our argument on the basis of a concise summary of the available evidence, it was not 
our objective to present a comprehensive review of the various literatures on tobacco and alcohol 
policy, nor to conduct a systematic review. 
 
Industry structures 
Industry structure is a key variable to consider when analysing the market and political 
strategies of alcohol and tobacco companies. Increased concentration of ownership by a small 
number of global actors is a key determinant of such strategies. In the case of tobacco and 
alcohol corporations this has significant consequences for consumption and harm levels. A key 
indicator of market structure is the concentration ratio of a sector. Both the tobacco and alcohol 
industries are highly concentrated around a small number of large producers. The global tobacco 
industry, is now dominated by four transnational corporations (TNCs) ± Philip Morris, British 
American Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International and Imperial Tobacco ± controlling over 50% 
of the world market (by volume) outside of China1.  The most commonly accepted measure of 
market concentration is the Hirschman±Herfindahl Index (HHI).2  Market scores range from a 
large number of small firms (HHI = close to 0) to one single, dominant firm (HHI = 10,000).  
HHI scores of less than 1,000 indicate low market concentration, those between 1,000 and 1,800 
moderate concentration, while scores above 1,800 signify highly concentrated markets. HHI 
figures for the tobacco industry show that almost all countries have very high concentration 
                                                             
1 The Chinese market is almost completely controlled by the government Chinese National Tobacco Corporation 
with around 2% of the market held by TTCs. 
2
 HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of all the firms competing in a particular sector and then summing 
the result. For instance, if four companies have market shares of 40, 25, 20, and 15% respectively, the HHI is40² + 
25² + 20² + 15² = 2,850. 
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ratios, with tobacco often the most concentrated sector in an economy. 3  For instance, the HHI 
scores for the tobacco industry in Europe are on average 2,750.  Figures for other regions and 
countries are similar or even higher (see Table 1). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
It is more difficult to assess the concentration ratio of the alcohol sector given its split 
among different product categories (e.g. beer, cider, wine and spirits), but three important 
observations can be made. 4   First, market liberalisation has facilitated a trend towards 
consolidation of all segments of the alcohol industry (Zeigler 2009, Jernigan 2009).  Second, 
despite consolidation, the global and national market concentration in the alcohol industry 
remains much lower than in tobacco. Third, the beer sector is significantly more concentrated 
than the wine and distilled spirits sectors, although this varies by region.  In most European 
markets the HHI score for the beer sector is between 800 and 1300, suggesting low to moderate 
concentration. However, many non-European markets are significantly more concentrated than 
this (see Table 1). The proposed merger between two of the largest transnational brewing 
corporations, Ab-Inbev and SABMiller announced in October 2015, suggests a trend towards 
even greater international concentration of ownership in the beer sector. 
In addition to market concentration, similarities exist in terms of the size, profitability 
and transnationality of corporations in both sectors (see Table 2). Tobacco companies rank 
DPRQJWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWDQGPRVWSURILWDEOHFRUSRUDWLRQV(Gilmore et al. 2010). Three tobacco 
companies feature in Fortune PDJD]LQH¶VGlobal 500 OLVW RI WKHZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW FRPSDnies by 
revenue, with Philip Morris International ranked at 362 in 2012.  Transnational alcohol 
corporations (TACs) are also highly profitable with the two largest, Anheuser-Busch InBev and 
Heineken, listed in the Global 500.  Moreover, both TTCs and TACs are among the most 
ZRUOG¶V PRVW WUDQVQDWLRQDO FRUSRUDWLRQV DV PHDVXUHG E\ 81&7$'¶V WUDQVQDWLRQDOLW\ LQGH[
(UNCTAD, 2013). In rankings of corporate profitability, measured by EBITA margin,5 tobacco 
corporations are uniquely profitable companies.  In 2011 BAT had an EBITA margin of 33.7% 
                                                             
3
 Figures presented in this section are WKHDXWKRUVµ calulations (based on 2013 Euromonitor data). 
4
 )LJXUHVLQWKLVVHFWLRQDUHDXWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQV(based on 2013 Euromonitor data).  
5
 $FRPSDQ\¶Vearnings before interest, taxes, and amortization, expressed as a percentage of total revenue. 
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and Imperial 39.5%, almost double that of companies on the food (Danone=15.9%) and fast-
PRYLQJ FRQVXPHU JRRGV VHFWRUV /¶2UHDO  ZKLFK RIIHU UHOHYDQW SRLQWV RI FRPSDULVRQ
(Gilmore et al. 2010).  Alcohol companies are also highly profitable with Diageo (31.8%) 
yielding profit ratios approaching those of the TTCs.  Brewers SABMiller (18.5%) and Carlsberg 
(17.1) lag some way behind the spirit producer, but are significantly more profitable than most 
other consumer goods firms (Gilmore et al. 2010). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
There are important similarities, but also some differences between the tobacco and 
alcohol industries in terms of concentration of ownership, the degree of transnationalisation and 
the profitability of the corporations in each sector. Whilst both sectors are dominated by a small 
number of highly profitable TNCs in comparison with other industries, the tobacco industry 
remains more concentrated and more profitable than the alcohol sector. The relative significance 
of these similarities and differences are key factors in understanding the market and political 
strategies employed by each industry, and thus evaluating the appropriateness of current policy 
responses. 
 
Market strategy 
The market strategies pursued by corporations have important implications for both 
public health and the way in which different sectors are regulated. There are marked similarities 
which exist between the market strategies pursued by transnational corporations in the tobacco 
and alcohol sectors. The tobacco industry has developed the white stick cigarette as a 
standardised product sold worldwide (Proctor 2012) and TTCs are heavily reliant on branding 
and marketing to differentiate their products, and to establish and retain customers (Hafez and 
Ling 2005, Hastings and MacFadyen 1998). The concentration of the global cigarette market 
means TTCs dominate most national markets. This grants TTCs a high level of control over 
product pricing (Gilmore 2012, Hedley 2007) which has become a key component of their 
business strategies, particularly in markets where branding activities are curtailed (Burton et al. 
2013, Shepherd 1985). TTCs have been able to offset the decline in sales in traditional markets, 
and maintain profits, through price increases (Gilmore et al. 2010) DQG µSUHPLXPLVDWLRQ¶
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encouraging more affluent smokers to trade up to more expensive brands (Gilmore 2012). At the 
same time, they have introduced an ultra-low-price category and have discounted cigarettes to 
target lower income groups, creating an entry point for non-smokers and deterring price sensitive 
smokers from quitting (Burton et al. 2013, Gilmore 2012). 
The alcohol industry is more diversified than the tobacco industry, involving a number 
of drinks categories. Nevertheless, it is highly dependent on branding, pricing and marketing 
activity (Giesbrecht 2000, Jernigan 2009, Jernigan and Babor 2015)µ3UHPLXPLVDWLRQ¶KDVDOVR
been identified as a key alcohol industry strategy (Eurocare 2009, Jernigan and Babor 2015), and 
TACs, like tobacco companies, segment their markets at different price points and lobby strongly 
to defend their right to sell cheap alcohol (Holden and Hawkins 2012, Jernigan and Babor 2015). 
This has seen a marked increase in the affordability of alcohol in recent decades as producers and 
retailers compete on price to achieve greater sales volumes and market share (Seabrook 2010, 
Hawkins et al. 2012). 
The increasingly transnational character of the tobacco and alcohol industries, combined 
with sophisticated marketing and pricing strategies, reflects the strategy of TTCs and TACs to 
establish new markets worldwide. This leads to increased consumption of their respective 
products, with a significant impact on public health (Stuckler et al. 2012, Jernigan and Babor 
2015, Connolly 1991, Stebbins 1991). A particularly noteworthy development in this regard has 
been the entry of TTCs and TACs into emerging markets in low and middle income countries 
(LMICs). Market saturation, and the unfavourable regulatory environments in established 
markets, have led both industries to seek new customers and new sources of profit.  Populous 
and increasingly affluent LMICs, with weak public health policies and comparatively low rates 
of alcohol and tobacco consumption offer the potential for significant growth (Stuckler et al. 
2012, Jernigan and Babor 2015). 
The reorientation towards emerging markets has been well documented in the tobacco 
industry (Lee et al. 2013). TTCs deployed significant resources to access markets in Latin 
America (Shepherd 1985), Asia (Lee et al. 2012b, Lambert et al. 2004) and Eastern Europe 
(Gilmore and McKee, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). However, TACs have also been quick to recognise 
the opportunity for expansion into new markets (Jernigan 2009, Economist 2011, Bakke and 
Endal 2010, Moodie et al. 2013), particularly in areas of the world with high rates of abstention 
(Jernigan and Babor 2015). Notwithstanding the differences identified, there are key parallels 
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between the responses of transnational actors in each industry to the challenges and opportunities 
presented by a globalising market place. 
 
Political strategy 
Political strategy refers to all activities undertaken by corporations to shape the regulatory 
environment, and has long been recognised as a key component of corporate strategy (Baron 
1995). Variations in corporate strategy between sectors offer a potential rationale for the 
different approaches to the tobacco and alcohol sectors by policy makers. Access to internal 
documents, and monitoring and catalogXLQJ RI 77&V¶ VWUDWHJLHV E\ VFKRODUV DQG SXEOLF KHDOWK
actors, has led to a fuller understanding of the political strategies pursued by TTCs than other 
industries (Savell et al. 2014, Smith et al. 2013, Holden and Lee 2009, Proctor 2012, Hurt et al. 
2009). 77&V¶DWWHPSWVWRLQIOXHQFHSROLF\LQFOXGHGOREE\LQJNH\GHFLVLRQPDNHUVGRQDWLRQVWR
political parties and campaigns and the provision of various gifts and corporate hospitality (Givel 
and Glantz 2001). In addition tobacco industry actors sought to shape wider social perceptions of 
smoking and the emerging policy debates through the subversion of science, and the deliberate 
creation of doubt about the effects of smoking and the effectiveness of tobacco control measures 
(Michaels 2008, Conway and Oreskes 2014). The aim of this strategy is to create controversy 
around the effects of smoking and the effectiveness of policy proposals; a perception that the 
scientific debate is not settled and that government should delay acting until more is known. 
Tactics employed included the recruitment and promotion of industry favourable scientists 
(Brandt 2012, Bero 2005) DQG WKH IRUPDWLRQ RI IURQW JURXSV DQG µDVWURWXUI¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQV
apparently independent campaign groups whose industry connections and funding are obscured 
(Givel and Glantz 2001, Apollonio and Bero 2007). As these practices were documented, and 
contact between policy makers and the tobacco industry became more controversial, TTCs have 
attempted to regain lost legitimacy and gain access to decision-makerV YLD µFRUSRUDWH VRFLDO
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶SURJUDPPHV(Fooks et al. 2011, Lee et al. 2012a). 
The transnational nature of the tobacco industry, and the increasingly global nature of 
policy-making, provides TTCs with ample opportunities to engage in venue shopping (or forum 
shifting) (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and to target those decision making arenas which are 
most favourably disposed towards their policy preferences (Eckhardt and De Bièvre 2015). For 
example, the protections provided to corporations within the WTO have been used to oppose 
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tobacco control policies at the national level (Sell 2003, Jarman et al. 2012). In addition, they 
have used Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Mechanisms within Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) to challenge the policies of national governments directly, mostly notably 
Australia and Uruguay in relation to cigarette packaging (Crosbie and Glantz 2012). 
While analyses of the political activities of the alcohol industry remain relatively 
limited, existing studies indicate a similar pattern of policy-influencing direct and indirect 
strategies employed by TACs, including extensive lobbying and attempts to shape public 
perceptions of alcohol and the scientific content of regulatory debates (McCambridge et al. 
2013b, Babor and Robaina 2013, Stenius and Babor 2010). In part, the similarity in tactics may 
be due to the co-ownership of alcohol and tobacco industry actors (Bond 2010, Bond 2009, Jiang 
and Ling 2013), and the transfer of strategies between sectors. Alcohol corporations have learned 
from the experience of TTCs, foreseeing the emergence of regulatory challenges and the need for 
strategic responses (Casswell 2013). Similar conclusions have been drawn about the links 
between pharmaceutical and tobacco corporations (Shamasunder and Bero 2002). This suggests 
a more general set of strategies and tactics which may be common to corporations in other 
health-relevant industries (Dorfman et al. 2012, White and Bero 2010, Conway and Oreskes 
2014). 
Alcohol industry actors, including both producers and retailers (e.g. bar operators, 
convenience stores and supermarkets), attempt to exert influence at all stages of the policy-
making process, from agenda setting to implementation and evaluation, and at all levels of 
decision making (Hawkins and Holden 2012), including attempts to frame the terms in which 
policy debates are couched (Hawkins and Holden 2013). Their objective is to develop long-term 
relationships with policy-makers, positioning themselves as key stakeholders in the regulatory 
process. CSR activities help to define them as responsible corporate citizens who are part of the 
policy solution, not the problem (Casswell 2013, Yoon and Lam 2012). Industry SAOs such as 
the International Centre for Alcohol Policies (ICAP) ± recently superseded by the International 
Alliance for Responsible Drinking ± are a key component of this strategy (Jernigan 2012). 
7$&V¶SHUFHLYHGDELOLW\WRGHOLYHUNH\µSROLF\JRRGV¶± e.g. information, employment, taxation 
revenue ± and to implement policy objectives (e.g. public information campaigns via Drinkaware 
in the UK and other self-regulatory regimes) means that partnerships are valued by government 
actors (Hawkins and Holden 2012). Consequently, industry views are heard and, where possible, 
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accommodated by policy makers (Hawkins and Holden 2012). In Africa, alcohol industry 
influence has extended so far as drafting virtually identical policies for four national 
governments (Bakke and Endal 2010). 
One key difference between the two industries is that partnership-based approaches can 
no longer be pursued by TTCs in many environments due to restrictions on government 
engagement with the tobacco industry under FCTC Article 5.3.  There remains significant scope 
for policy influence afforded to the alcohol industry through this form of engagement.  However, 
when the partnership-building approach fails, like the tobacco industry, TACs are prepared to 
resort to more confrontational methods such as legal action.  This was seen in the case of MUP 
in Scotland where EU competition and trade law was invoked to challenge the legislation 
(Holden and Hawkins 2012).  If the political status of the industry shifts further, and the level of 
access to decision makers declines, TAC strategy may further come to resemble that of TTCs, 
using WTO agreements and BITs to stymie effective policy measures. 
 
Discussion  
Tobacco use is widely regarded as an exceptional threat to public health which has given 
rise to a unique global policy response in the FCTC, including Article 5.3 requiring the exclusion 
of the industry from direct participation in the policy making process. The unique public health 
threat posed by tobacco has provided a powerful rationale for strengthening tobacco control 
policies worldwide. Yet, a narrow focus on the exceptional nature of tobacco as a product may 
OLPLWWKHSRWHQWLDOµVSLOORYHU¶RISURYHQIRUPVRIUHJXODWLRQHJRQSULFHODEHOOLQJDQGSURGXFW
availability) into other policies relating to harmful products. Furthermore it may serve to 
facilitate the participation of corporate actors beyond the tobacco industry in the policy process, 
with a detrimental effect on public health. Alcohol, for example, is currently subject to less 
extensive forms of regulation than tobacco, and alcohol industry actors continue to be afforded 
access to national and global policy-making forums in ways which are now often closed to 
tobacco industry actors. 
Important differences exist between tobacco and alcohol as products, which may 
influence their perception by policy makers and the wider public. There is evidence that low 
levels of alcohol consumption do not pose significant health risks (McCambridge and Hartwell 
2014, Fekjaer 2013), although the definition of what constitutes a safe level of alcohol 
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consumption remains the subject of intense debate within the public health community 
(Stockwell and Room 2012). In contrast, there is no safe level of cigarette smoking (WHO 
2008), a fact now acknowledged even by the tobacco industry (British American Tobacco 2014). 
However, a narrow focus on the harmfulness of the products ignores other crucial factors such as 
industry structure and strategy, which shape the health impacts of each sector, and may provide 
alternative rationales for the policy approaches taken towards them.  
There are significant similarities between the alcohol and tobacco industries which 
appear at odds with the very different policy approaches in each area. Tobacco and alcohol are 
both responsible for high levels of global morbidity and mortality (WHO 2015a, WHO 2015b). 
Whilst the degree of concentration in the tobacco industry exceeds that in the alcohol industry, 
both industries are dominated by a small number of large, transnational, and highly-profitable 
corporations. Moreover, the current trend in the alcohol industry appears to be towards even 
greater consolidation and transnationalisation (Jernigan and Babor 2015). TACs are the only 
corporations approaching the levels of profitability seen in the tobacco industry (Gilmore et al. 
2010). Corporations in both sectors employ sophisticated marketing and pricing strategies to 
drive consumption, including in their expansion into emerging markets, and attempt to shape 
regulatory debates through remarkably similar political strategies.  
The comparison of the political economy of the tobacco and alcohol industries presented 
above challenges the rationale for the current variations in policy and industry engagement. The 
differences which exist between the alcohol and tobacco industries, and the products they make, 
do not appear to be significant enough to justify such widely diverging regulatory approaches 
given the similarities which exist in terms of the market and political strategies pursued, and the 
industry structures which facilitate these. Above all, the rationale fRUWKHµSDUWQHUVKLS¶DSSURDFK
RIWHQ H[WHQGHG WR DOFRKRO FRUSRUDWLRQV DQG WKHLU FRPPRQ VWDWXV DV µLQVLGHUV¶ LQ WKH SROLF\-
making process must be called into question.  
The current article is limited in its scope, focussing on the political economy of each 
industry. It seeks also to critique and problematize current policy regimes without attempting to 
explain their historical emergence. To explain the different policy regimes, and the status 
afforded to the tobacco and alcohol industries would require a far deeper engagement with a 
range of different factors influencing policy outcomes.  The prevailing policy regimes in each 
area reflect not just evidence about the health harms caused by tobacco and alcohol and the depth 
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of knowledge we have about the activities of these industries (Hurt et al. 2009), but the political 
priorities of policy makers, the wider public acceptability of regulation in each area and the 
ability of advocates and campaigners to agitate for effective policy responses (Gneiting 2015, 
Wipfli 2015, Schmitz 2014, Gneiting and Schmitz 2016). The relative marginalisation of the 
WREDFFR LQGXVWU\ ZDV EURXJKW DERXW LQ SDUW WKURXJK WKH GLVFORVXUH RI 77&V¶ DWWHPSWV WR
undermine research and public policy in the pursuit of profit, and the use of this information by 
advocates to shape policy debates. The unavailability of internal alcohol industry documents, in 
particular, means far less is known about their political strategies. As a result of this, TACs are 
perceived differently from the tobacco industry by both policy makers and the general public. 
 
Conclusion 
$QHPHUJLQJOLWHUDWXUHKDVEHJXQWRFDWDORJXHWKHDOFRKROLQGXVWU\¶VDFWLYLWLHVEDVHGRQ
publically available sources and key informant interviews. As well as more research on the 
political strategies of TACs, similar studies are needed of other health harming industries, 
including comparative studies across sectors. The political economy approach outlined in this 
article aims to facilitate such cross-industry comparisons in the pursuit of more effective health 
policy. It focuses on key factors influencing the political and market strategies pursued by 
corporations, their ability to execute these strategies and the rationale for different policy 
approaches and government engagement with industry actors. The similarities in political 
strategies pursued by the tobacco and alcohol industries raise important questions about the 
appropriateness of current forms of engagement between policy makers and the alcohol industry. 
It appears that far closer scrXWLQ\ RI WKH DOFRKRO LQGXVWU\¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ SROLF\ PDNLQJ LV
warranted. We are unable on the basis of the preceding analysis to explain the emergence and 
maintenance of the very different policy regimes applied to tobacco and alcohol. However, given 
the similarities we identify between industries, alcohol policy makers may look to tobacco 
control, and the range of policy measures implemented in this area, as a source of effective and 
justifiable regulatory approaches (e.g. on pricing, promotion and availability). Likewise, alcohol 
policy advocates may seek to learn from the success of the tobacco control community, and the 
successful policy influencing strategies they have employed, in their efforts to bring about more 
effective alcohol policies at the national and global levels.  
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Table 1. HHI Scores for the Tobacco and Beer Industries by Country/ Region. 
Country/ Region Tobacco Beer 
Russia 2500 1,750 
Europe 2750 800-1300 
US 3,100 2,750 
Australia 3,500 3,500 
Japan 4,000 2,500 
India 6,100 3,500 
Brazil 6,200 4,300 
South Africa 6,900 6,300 
China 10,000 1,200 
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQ(XURPRQLWRUGDWD 
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Table 2. Tobacco and Alcohol Producers Compared by Size and Transnationality (2012). 
COMPANY Anheuser
-Busch 
InBev 
Philip 
Morris 
Internation
al 
Heineke
n 
Holding 
Japan 
Tobacc
o 
British 
America
n 
Tobacco 
SABMille
r PLC 
Pernod
-Ricard 
SA 
INDUSTRY Alcohol Tobacco Alcohol Tobacc
o 
Tobacco Alcohol Alcoho
l 
HOME 
ECONOMY 
Belgium USA Nether-
lands 
Japan UK UK France 
G500 
RANKING 
264 362 458 459 485   
UNCTAD 
RANKING BY 
FOREIGN 
ASSETS 
15   90* 68 48 99 
UNCTAD 
RANKING BY 
TNI 
4   75* 21 13 15 
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
(US$ millions) 
122,621 
 
37,670 47,428 44,573
* 
44,183 56,294 35,692 
FOREIGN 
ASSETS 
(US$ millions) 
115,913 
 
  32,789
* 
42,165 55,896 30,457 
TOTAL 
SALES 
(US$ millions) 
39,758 31,377 25,565 25,741
* 
24,073 34,487 10,991 
FOREIGN 
SALES 
(US$ millions) 
39 046 
 
  12,430
* 
18,618 28,720 9,993 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYMEN
T 
117,632 
 
  48,472
* 
56,363 71,144 18,307 
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FOREIGN 
EMPLOYMEN
T 
109,566 
 
  23,902
* 
44,660 57,049 15,594 
TNI % 92.8   57.1* 84.0 87.6 87.1 
PROFITS (US$ 
millions) 
7,243 8,800 1,898 4,138 6,087   
PROFIT AS % 
OF REVENUE 
18.2 28 7.4 16.2 25.3   
PROFITS AS 
% OF ASSETS 
5.9 23.4 4 10.1 13.7   
 
Sources: G500 ranking, profits, profits as % of revenue, and profits as % of assets from(Fortune 
2013).  Total assets and total sales for Philip Morris International and Heineken Holding from 
(Fortune 2013).  All other data from (UNCTAD 2013)[except *Japan Tobacco UNCTAD data, 
which is from (UNCTAD 2012)]. 
 
Notes: 
Data is for the financial year ending on or before 31st March 2013 (*except UNCTAD data for 
Japan Tobacco, which is for the financial year ending on or before 31st March 2012).  Fortune 
PDJD]LQH¶V* OLVW UDQNV WKHZRUOG¶V ODUJHVW FRUSRUDWLRQVE\ UHYHQXH 81&7$'UDQNV
WKH WUDQVQDWLRQDOLW\ RI WKH ZRUOG¶V WRS 00 non-financial TNCs by foreign assets and by a 
µ7UDQVQDWLRQDOLW\ ,QGH[¶ 71, 7KH 71, LV FDOFXODWHG DV WKH DYHUDJH RI WKH IROORZLQJ WKUHH
ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign employment to total 
employment.  UNCTAD employment data for SABMiller PLC refers to revised 2011 figures. 
 
